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NOTES
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A LIMITATION ON THE SEVERAL STATES OR
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT?
The proposed objective of this paper is to explore William
Crosskey's interpretation of the Constitution as given in
his two-volume study, Politics and the Constitution in the History
of the United States. Specifically, it will analyze what he called
the Supreme Court's "destruction" of Constitutional limita-
tion on state authority. Chapter XXX will be the basis of the
study. The plan of the power includes an introductory chapter
revealing basic background relevant to the study, the general
area under discussion, and a basis upon which conclusions will
be drawn. The second chapter is devoted to a review of several
pertinent points in Crosskey's Chapter XXX. These are
brought out to provide points of discussion for the following
chapter. Chapter III is the core of the study. Herein lies
the contention that Mr. Crosskey presented his readers, not a
complete and unprejudiced text, but rather a one-sided brief.
From its antecedents in the English system, succeeding sec-
tions of Chapter III are devoted to stages of development
from the Federal Convention of 1787 until the Barton de-
cision of 1833. In the course of the paper, deletions have
been made only to shorten long quotations. Except where
otherwise indicated, all underlining and parentheses are
those of this author.
INTRODUCTION
In the interest of sound national government, William
Crosskey presented his monumentous two-volume work to
the public. It was, he claimed, a dear insight into the real
meaning of the Constitution. He held that the words of the
Constitution-the text, per se--have an intrinsic meaning
apart from the intent of the framers or the understanding of
the ratifying bodies or the general public. In the light of the
facts presented, this interpretation seems dear and valid; his
documentation and logic appear sound.
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In supporting his contention, Crosskey referred to many
sources, including newspaper accounts, court decisions,
opinions of the day, and discussions held in the ratifying
assemblies. How these can be divorced from the above men-
tioned sources of interpretation used by other analysts which
Crosskey has discouhted, is mysterious. How one can state
what the text means, not what it was "intended" to mean or
"understood" to mean, and at the same time use these very
sources in support of such statements, is indeed a curious
methodology. Nevertheless, by so doing, the door was
opened to conflicting evidence of a similar nature. Thus
without any longer pursuing the semantics of "intent",
"meaning", "understanding", etc., there must follow an
inquiry into the validity of Mr. Crosskey's supporting evi-
dence.
Politics and the Constitution covers almost every point in
the Constitution. In order to do justice to the research and
scholarship of its author, it would be near impossible to re-
view, point by point, every thing that he has covered. There-
fore, the following is selected as a particular sample of Cross-
key's work: Chapter XXX is entitled "The Supreme Court's
Destruction of the Constitutional Limitation on State Au-
thority, Contained in the Original Constitution and Initial
Amendments." In this chapter Crosskey concludes that the
Supreme Court erroneously relinquished its position as the
leader of a national judiciary system that the framers "in-
tended." He also concluded that this same Court "without
any warrant at all", incorrectly held the first eight amend-
ments, the "Bill of Rights", inapplicable to the several states. 1
The author will concentrate his discussion in this phase of his
study (the applicability of the initial amendments). Mr.
Crosskey has referred to the deliberations of the Federal
Convention, several state conventions, court decisions, and
the opinions of "good lawyers" and judges of the time.
It can be shown that Crosskey, in his case for general
applicability of the Bill of Rights, has ignored its historical
antecedents, has neglected to show both sides of the issue,
has made liberal use of connotation, and has used the issue
to support his general hypothesis.
1 2 Crosskey, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1052.
What is the validity of Crosskey's book, Politics and the
Constitution as a reliable text? It is conceded that Mr. Crosskey
has prepared a convincing brief. However, the work is pre-
sented as an authoritative, accurately documented text. In
this light, Mr. Crosskey has left many questions unanswered
and others well hidden. It will merely be inferred that Mr.
Crosskey's study is similar to almost any other research of its
kind, that is, somewhat limited and bound by the philosophy
and preconceptions of its author.
Crosskey's Views of the Constitutional
Limitations of State Authority
Mr. Crosskey's general belief is, that the Constitution and
the original amendments should be interpreted by reading the
text together with an eighteenth century word-usage dictionary
dose at hand. He feels the Constitution leaves no leeway for
broad interpretation of its powers. Mr. Crosskey also gives
us what he calls "eighteenth century rules of construction."
By this he refers to the style of draftsmanship used by the
framers of all constitutions and amendments of the period.
Crosskey daims this particularly prevalent style, if understood,
should aid the analyst in finding the meaning of documents.
He feels the Constitution provides the United States with
a strong national government of few limitations, delegating
to the several states the handling of local problems only.
That it allows the American people, through the Congress,
to handle any subject they so desire.2 On the subject of the
Supreme Court, he feels its function is that of the nation's
judicial head, but that the Court should not pass on acts of
Congress. Crosskey is of the opinion that the Court has
delved in "sophistries", given fragmentary and irrational
judgments, and "surreptitiously ignored" the real meaning
of the Constitution, which he sees so dearly. 3
In 1833, the Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice John
Marshall, gave an important decision in Barron v. Mayor and
2Id., 1172.
3 Id., 1173.
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City Council of Baltimore.4 In this case Barron was appealing
a lower court decision; he reasoned that, in his difficulties
with the City of Baltimore, he was entitled to the protection
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. Marshall and the majority of the Court felt otherwise
and so stated in their decision. It is this decision that Crosskey
labels "unwarranted."
It is from this point, Crosskey enters his evidence which
he feels disproves the position held by the Supreme Court.
Crosskey states that the Court's position, as far as the First
Amendment is concerned, is correct since Congress is specifi-
cally referred to. He also agrees that Barron v. Baltimore was
correct with respect to the appeals clause of the Seventh
Amendment. However, Crosskey claims that the specification
of these two points only serves to make more clear the general
applicability of the remainder of the Amendments. It is at
this point that he turns to the substance of these amendments,
and holds that they were "intended", at that time, to be general
prohibitions on both national and state action. Each amend-
ment he points out covers areas which seemingly could be
usurped by either level of government. He continues his
discussion by noting that since only about one-half of the
states had bills of rights, the need for a general bill was wide-
spread. At this point he states: "At least one of the state
ratifying conventions had seemed to desire the enactment of
just such a general bill of rights."5 This was the ratifying
convention of Virginia. He points out that the proposed
"bill of rights" from Virginia stands separate from the other
amendments offered by Virginia (which specifically referred to
Congress, judicial power of the United States, etc). Thus,
Crosskey reasons, in Virginia at least, these people desired to
strengthen their own constitution by placing an obligation on
Virginia to bring her own bill of rights in line with that of
the United States. At the same time, the prestige and pressure
of the Federal Bill of Rights would cause it to be enforced more
effectively.
4 7 Peters (10 U. S. ) 243 (1833).
5 2 Crosskey, 1061.
Crosskey then considers the "eighteenth century con-
structionary rules" which he says must guide any interpretation
of the amendments. After stating how general words may be
made the subject of equities of restraint, he says, "The evidence
of purpose giving rise to such equities of restraint-or for
that matter, to equities of fulfillment-had to be strong and
dear." 6 In practice, this meant that any document of the
sort under discussion had to have its purpose and applica-
bility in the preamble or introduction, the remainder could be
general; otherwise, specification, phrase by phrase, would be
used.
As another pillar to support his case, Crosskey draws on
the preamble to the Amendments, as they were presented to
the states. This preamble, which never became a part of the
Constitution, stated, ".... a number of the states, at the Time
of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a Desire, in
order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its Powers, that
further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added."
This is to emphasize that in this scheme of government, the
Constitution embraced state as well as national powers. Con-
tinuing on, Crosskey points out that: ". . . any man of the
times who read the current newspaper accounts of Congress'
proceedings must, then certainly have concluded that the
literal generality of these amendments were intended, ...
they were ratifying limitations, not only on the nation, but
on the state governments as well."7 In this section he notes
that the Supreme Court Justices of New York in 1820 agreed
to this philosophy. He also states that two "well-known
law writers", Angell of Providence, and Rawle of Philadelphia,
took a similar point of view in 1828 and 1829. 8
In the last six pages of Chapter XXX, Crosskey turns
directly to the opinion and reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall
in the Barron case. He notes that it contradicts views ex-
pressed by Marshall in earlier decisions. Also he discusses the
probability that Marshall had come under the influence of
6 Id., 1064.
7 Id., 1076.
8 Ibid.
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"State's Rights" elements, and had surrendered to them.
To this he adds on many occasions Marshall gave court
opinions even when they were repugnant to his own opinion
and vote. At the same time, he says Justice Story had the
admitted habit of silently submitting to the majority even
when he differed with them. 9 In conclusion he arrives at the
opinion that the doctrine established in Barron v. Baltimore
"appears to have been a sham." He states that not one of
Chief Justice Marshall's reasons for the decision can be
supported. In Crosskey's own words, "The decision of the
Court, and the doctrine for which it stands, constitutes, in
fact, one of the most extensive and indefensible of all the
various failures of the Court to enforce the Constitution
against the states as the document is written." 10
Without any basis for such action Crosskey feels Chief
Justice Marshall succumbed to an "imaginary State's Rights
Doctrine" of the time and thus started a trend which was not
corrected until late in the nineteenth century.
A CONTRADICTORY POINT OF VIEW
The preceding brought out the main points of William
Crosskey's attack on the Supreme Court's decision in the
case of Barron v. Mayor and City of Baltimore. These views
were supported by introducing references to the First Congress,
the intent of the framers of original amendments, contempo-
rary opinions and newspaper articles, as well as court decisions
prior to the Barron case. It is my contention that Mr. Crosskey
rather than compiling an accurate history or account of the
subject, prepared a brief that fitted his overall thesis.
Upon viewing the situation of the colonists prior to the
Revolution, it cannot be denied that they were, politically
and socially, still Englishmen. The environment of the New
World did have its effects; yet, their heritage and traditions
were common. When the locus of power was transferred by
way of revolution, from London to America, the colonists did
9 Id., 1080.
10 Id., 1081.
not forget their earlier political philosophy. The Declaration
of Independence was a compilation of grievances against the
Crown; it stated that in light of their rights as Englishmen,
which had been denied them, revolution was the only recourse.
True English freemen were entitled to the protection of the
English "bill of rights" secured during the revolution of 1688.
This act, passed by the Parliament, spelled out the conditions
upon which the Prince of Orange and his wife, Mary, would
be invited to take the throne vacated by James II. The first
part of the document enumerates twelve ways in which
James II abridged their liberties and rights. Naturally, in a
desire to avoid any such recurrence, the Convention Parliament
wanted to establish certain undeniable rights which suc-
ceeding Parliaments and sovereigns would recognize as
inviolate. 1
This limitation upon a grant of power was obviously
paralleled in America. The several states, upon creating a
central government, felt the need to limit its scope and pro-
tect themselves from its possible encroachment. The following
documents in their chronological order provide a continuous
thread of beliefs establishing this parallel even more dearly:
the English Bill of Rights of 1688; the Virginia Bill of Rights
of June 12, 1776 (drawn by George Mason); the Declaration
of Independence of 1776; and, the Bill of Rights of 1789-91.
The continuity as well as the terms and phrasing are dear.
There can be no doubt that the intentions of both bills are
analogous. 12
From a contemporary of Marshall and Story there is a
similar statement of the recognized identity between the
English model and our Bill of Rights. Justice Henry Baldwin
of the Supreme Court states:
I find a weight of political authority, which my
mind cannot resist and so feel bound to trace the great
work of the fathers of the revolution and the country,
back to its source in the common law, the magna charta,
"1 Chandler, GENESIS AND BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
148.
12 See, Dumballs, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, viii and 139.
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and the constitution of England; the basis and pattern
of our own ... Taking it as already apparent, that in
1774 and 1776, our constitution was the English consti-
tution, and the free system of English law was the
common law then; and that system to yet be the law of
the land, by the authority of the states, the constitution,
the acts of Congress and the adjudications of this court.
It is in this law that we find the rules of interpretation.
13
Justice Story in his Exposition of the Constitution of the United
States (dedicated to students), held an identical point of view,
stated as follows:
In the next place, a Bill of Rights is important and
may often be indispensable, whenever it operates as a
qualification upon powers actually granted by the
people to the government. This is the real ground of
all the Bills of Rights in the parent country, in the
Colonial constitution and laws, and in the State consti-
tutions. In England, the Bills of Rights were not
demanded merely of the Crown as withdrawing a power
from the Royal prerogative; they were equally im-
portant, as withdrawing power from Parliament. A
large proportion of the most valuable of the provisions
in the Magna Charta, and the Bill of Rights of 1688,
consists of a solemn recognition of the limitations
upon the powers of Parliament; that is, a declaration
that Parliament ought not to abolish, or restrict those
rights. Such are the rights of trial by jury, etc .... 1 4
Thus in spite of the prevalence at the time of broad theories
of democratic government inspired by Locke and Montesquieu,
the American Bill of Rights stands as a pragmatic limitation
on a grant of power. The only model available for such an
approach-the English Bill of Rights of 1688-in similar
fashion limited William and Mary and succeeding monarchs
and Parliaments in their exercise of power.
13 Baldwin, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
(1837 ed.), 7.
14 Story, COMM. (1857 ed.) 257.
At the Federal Convention of 1787, a "bill of rights" did
not enter the discussion of the assembly until a few days from
its conclusion. When it did, the proposal was not felt to be
necessary, on the ground that any set of enumerated rights
would infer no restraint on any which would possibly have
been omitted. It was felt that the general provisions of the
Constitution itself would prove bulwark enough to safeguard
liberty. The main consideration of the convention was to
present a constitution to the states which would be received
favorably and not arouse any great dissent over relinquishing
sovereignty. The following statement by John Lansing, a
delegate from New York, is along this line of reasoning:
If we form a government, let us do it on principles
of which are likely to meet the approbation of the
states. Great changes can only be gradually intro-
duced. The states will never sacrifice their essential
rights to a national government. New plans anni-
hilating the rights of states (unless upon evident
necessity), can never be approved. 15
He was a supporter of the Constitution but came from New
York, a state in which the Constitution was later bitterly
opposed for the reasons Lansing above states.
When the Constitution was presented to the states, much
discussion arose in almost every ratifying convention over
forfeiting control and power to the general government. With
the exception of Mr. Crosskey's reference to the Virginia
Convention, little or none of this material is brought out in
his Chapter XXX. Since he did refer to the Virginia Con-
vention, it seems only fair that a dose look be taken at what
the other conventions had to say.
In Pennsylvania the desire to look into the possibility of
amendments was drafted; "It ha(d) been thought expedient
that delegates ... should meet together for the purpose of
deliberating on the subject..." 16 These conferees assembled
and the following excerpt from their petition for amendments
and corrections reads:
15 1 Elliott, DEBATES 412.
16 2 Elliott, DEBATES 543.
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That your petitioners possess sentiments completely
federal, being convinced that a confederation of repub-
lican states and no other can secure political liberty,
happiness . . . They are well apprized of the necessity
of developing extensive powers to congress, and of
vesting the supreme legislature with every power and
resource of a general nature, and consequently they
acquiesce in the general system of government framed
by the late Federal Convention,-in full confidence,
- however, that the same will be reviewed without de-
lay; for, however worthy... this system may be, your
petitioners conceive that amendments on some parts
of the plan are essential not only to the preservation
of such rights and privileges as ought to be reserved
in the respective states, and in the citizens thereof, but
to the fair and unembarrassed operation of the govern-
ment in its various departments. 17
From the above discussion, it is indeed difficult to come to
the same condusion as Mr. Crosskey-that the states were
attempting to apply these proposed amendments to them-
selves as well as the government of the United States.
In Massachusetts we find a similar feeling of jealousy to-
wards the potential power of the general government. The
following is the preface to the proposed amendments ac-
companying the state's ratification of the Constitution of
the United States:
And as it is the opinions of this convention, that
certain amendments and alterations in the said Consti-
tution would remove the fears and quiet the appre-
hensions of many of the good people of the Common-
wealth, and more effectively guard against undue
administration of the federal government, the con-
vention do therefore recommend that the following
alterations and provisions be introduced into the said
constitution. 1 8
17 Id., 544.
18 Id., 117.
Following this preface, which dearly states the appli-
cability and intention of the authors, are a list of amendments.
Some were specific, others more general in character. New
Hampshire in similar manner, with exact same wording of
the preface, presented a document..9 Why Mr. Crosskey
failed to present these facts to his readers is baffling.
Mr. Crosskey in supporting his contention drew on the
Virginia convention. He states this as proof that at least one
state desired a general bill of rights, applicable to all levels of
government. Herein lies just such a point as was mentioned
in the preceding paragraph. Crosskey quoted and discussed
the Virginia prefaces to the amendments, allowing the reader
to conclude that such was their desire (a general bill of rights).
Yet a closer perusal of activities recorded in Elliott brought to
light certain statements which indicate otherwise. Virginia,
when she finally ratified the Constitution, sent the engrossed
ratification to Congress a few days prior to the formulations
of their "general" bill of rights. Enclosed in this ratification
was the following:
We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, duly
elected.. ., do in the name and in behalf of the people
of Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers
granted under the Constitution . . . [cannot] be can-
celled, abridged, restrained or modified, by the Congress,
by the Senate or House of Representatives, acting in any
capacity, by the President, or any department or
officer of the United States, except in those instances
in which power is given by the Constitution for those
purposes; and that among other essential rights, the
liberty of conscience and of the press cannot be can-
celled, abridged, restrained, or modified by any au-
thority of the United States.
With these impressions, . . . and under the con-
viction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the
Constitution ought rather to be examined in the mode
prescribed therein, than to bring the union into danger
by delay, with a hope of obtaining amendments previous
to the ratification.
19 21 U. Chi. L.Rev. 49.
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We, the said delegates, in the name and behalf of
the people of Virginia, do, by these presents, assent to
and ratify the Constitution . . . for the government of
the United States.2 0
In light of this statement of ratification, Crosskey's "one
state" desirous of a "general" bill of rights, does not appear
so all conclusive as he would have his readers believe.
The Constitution was bitterly opposed by many New
Yorkers, who were fervently against giving up any sovereignty.
Yet, through the propaganda efforts of Hamilton, Jay, and
Madison, as well as the prestige lent to the Constitution by
the chairmanship of General Washington, it was finally
ratified, conditionally.
On Saturday, July 19, 1788, Mr. Lansing moved to "post-
pone the several propositions before the house in order to
take into consideration a draft of a conditional ratification
with a bill of rights prefixed and amendments subjoined."21
Thus New York wanted a bill of rights to be "prefixed" to a
constitution for the United States. After conditional ratifi-
cation, a circular letter was sent to the governors of the several
states rallying support for amendments to the Constitution.
The following is an excerpt from their plea:
We, the members of the Convention of this state,
have deliberately and maturely considered the con-
stitution proposed for the United States.* Several
articles in it appear objectionable to us . . . we observe
that amendments have been proposed, and are anxiously
desired by several of the states, as well as by this,
and we think it of great importance that effectual
measures be immediately taken.. . 2
Again, the state, in fear (or jealousy) of federal power, wanted
to limit the extent to which the general government could
operate.
20 3 Elliott, DEBATES 656.
21 2 Elliott, DEBATES 411.
22 Id., 414.
In Maryland the committee on amendments put forth
the suggestion that "all warrants without oath... to search
suspected places or seize any person on his property are
grievous and oppressive, and all general warrants to search
suspected places or to apprehend any person suspected . . .
are dangerous and ought not to be given."23 According to
Crosskey's eighteenth century constructionary rules, this
general statement would appear all inclusive in intent and
application. Yet a majority of the committee felt that such
an amendment was indispensable for the following reason:
Congress, having the power of laying excise, by
which our dwelling houses . . . will be laid open to
the insolence and oppressions of office, there could be
no constitutional check provided that would prove so
effectual a safeguard to those magistrates who are to
administer the general government. 2 4
Again it seems to this author that the basic intention of these
men was to protect the citizens of their own respective state
from undue exercise of power by the general government.
It also seems likely that all these preceding remarks made in
ratifying conventions were well known to Crosskey. While
spending thirteen years in preparing his work, it seems un-
likely that he would pass over all of Jonathan Elliot's Debates,
except the section on Virginia.
During the ratification period, Mr. Iredell, a North Caro-
lina member of the Federal Convention, was addressing his
North Carolinian brethren in an attempt to gain passage of
the document. His words express the feeling which, this
author feels, Mr. Crosskey either avoided, or did not wish to
convey. "The general ground of objections seems to be that
the power proposed to the general government may be abused
* . . on these principles I am of the opinion that some amend-
ments should be proposed."25
23 3 Elliott, DEBATES 551-552.
24 Id., 551.
25 4 Elliott, DEBATES 219.
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John Marshall, in his Life of George Washington, devoted
several paragraphs to Thomas Jefferson's feelings on the
proposed constitution. At the time, Jefferson was in Paris:
Mr. Jefferson therefore, seems to have entertained
no jealousy of the state sovereignties; and no suspi-
cion of their encroachments. His fears took a different
direction, and all his precautions were used to check
and limit the exercise of the powers vested in the
government of the United States. Neither could he
perceive danger to liberty except from that government,
and especially from the executive department.
He . . . had, at one time, avowed a wish that it
might be rejected by such a number of states as would
secure certain alterations which be thought essential.
His principal objections seem to have been, the want of
a bill of rights, and the re-eligibility of the Presi-
dent. 2 6
That this expression of Jefferson's feelings is accurate may
be further evidenced by excerpts from his letters. The fol-
lowing were written from Paris prior to any Congressional
action on a bill of rights. The first is to James Madison,
encouraging him to press for such a bill in the first session
of Congress. After pointing to the positive values Jefferson
concludes:
I hope, therefore, a bill of rights will be formed to
guard the people against the federal government, as they
are akeady guarded against their State governments in
most instances 27
A second letter, the following year, to Francis Hopkinson, in
which Jefferson was defending his position:
What I disapproved from the first moment also was
the omission of a bill of rights, to guard liberty against
the legislative as well as the executive branches of the
2 6 Marshall, THE LIFE OF WASHINGTON 232.
27 Dumbald, POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 142.
NOTES
government; that is to say, to secure freedom in religion
freedom of the press . s
It was Jefferson who acted as one of the primary links
between the American Bill of Rights and its English counter-
part. The Dedaration of Independence was a statement on the
loss of the rights stated in the Bill of Rights of 1688. Couched
in terms similar to the 1688 bill, the Dedaration came from
Jefferson's pen. Later, the Constitution was without such a bill
until Madison and others, convinced and urged by Jefferson,
succeeded in 1789.
When the First Session of Congress convened, James Madi-
son introduced to the House of Representatives a number of
amendments to propose to the states. It was his belief that these
amendments, interpreted by the judiciary, would prove a
bulwark against possible legislative or executive encroachment
of rights. He also felt that a "bill of rights" would gain
popular support for the Constitution:
But I will candidly acknowledge that... the
Constitution may be amended. That is to say of
all power to abuse, then it is possible the abuse of the
powers of the General Government may be guarded
against in a more secure manner than is now done while
no one advantage is arising from the exercise of that
power shall be damaged or endangered by it. 29
Thus it was his intention to present a bill "to guard against any
possible abuses by the General Government... and along
with these prohibitions against the states." It is significant
that of all the amendments presented by Madison, the one
which specifically restricted state power were not passed on to
the states for action.3o To implement these amendments,
Madison desired to insert them within the body of the ratified
Constitution. However, Roger Sherman of Connecticut
28 Prescott, HAMILTON AND JEFFERSON TO FRANCIS HOPKINSON,
PARIS 13 March 1789, 293.
2 9 ANNUALS OF CONGRESS 432-39.
30 "No State shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of the
press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."
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pointed out that this would require a re-interpretation of the
document and also create confusion. Thus they were placed at
the end. Crosskey holds that if Madison's method had been
used then the Barron v. Baltimore decision would have been
correct. Since they were subjoined however, he feels that
Marshall's decision was erroneous. It seems strange that he
ignores the obvious reason for sub-joining the amendments
(darity and accuracy).
Reverting back to the point when the Constitution's fate
was in the hands of the state conventions, there are a number of
contemporary newspaper articles which show how the docu-
ment was then understood. The first is a letter written under the
pen name of "The Landholder." He concluded as follows:
"To have inserted in this constitution, a bill of rights for the
states, would suppose them to derive and hold their rights from
the Federal governments when the reverse is true."31 From this
letter one may infer that a bill of rights was understood to be
for the benefit and protection of the states. It was written from
the view that such bill was not really necessary in the Con-
stitution. Later "The Landholder" had charged Luther Martin
[Martin was a member of the late Federal Convention] with
allowing the Constitution too much federal power. In reply to
this charge Martin said:
The more the system advanced, the more I was im-
pressed with the necessity of... forming a complete bill
of rights . . . to serve as a barrier between the general
government and the respective states and their citizens.
The rejection of the clauses attempted in favour of
particular rights, and to check and restrain the dangerous
and exorbitant powers of the general government from
being abused, had sufficiently taught me what to
expect. 3 2
Martin, the next week wrote another letter, addressed to
"The Citizens of Maryland." His point is even dearer in the
following two paragraphs:
31 CONNECTICUT COURANT, 10 Dec. 1787; See also, Ford, ESSAYS ON
THE CONSTITUTION 163.
32 Maryland Journal, 21 March 1788; See also, Frarand, RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 290.
There is my fellow citizens, scarcely an individual
of common understanding, I believe, in this state,
who is in any way acquainted with the proposed
constitution, who doth not allow it to be, in many
instances, extremely censurable, and that a variety
of alterations and amendments are essentially requisite,
to render it consistent with a reasonable security
for the liberty of the respective states and their citizens.
Reflect also, I entreat you, my fellow citizens, that
the alterations and amendments which are wanted in the
present system are of such a nature as to diminish and
lessen, to check and restrain, the powers of the general
government ... 33
One must conclude the opposite point of view than that
which Crosskey presents.
Before moving to the Barron case itself, it is interesting to
note the feelings of two men on the scene prior to the decision
of Barron v. Baltimore. First was Chancellor Kent, chief of the
New York Court of Errors. In 1827, prior to his retirement, he
wrote a broad commentary on the American judicial system and
its practices. One of his lectures entitled "Of Constitutional
Restrictions on the Powers of the Several States," of which not
one sentence makes any reference to the applicability of the
bill of rights upon the states. Surely, if this was a subject of
doubt during his time on the bench, Kent would not have
neglected to mention it. 34
In another work, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States, by Joseph Story, is found additional evidence
of this view. Story's Commentaries were written about a year
prior to Barron v. Baltimore; and, while the book contains no
pointed remarks on the applicability of the amendments, there
are useful references. First is a general statement by Story on
the reason for such amendments:
33 Maryland Journal 28 March 1788; See also, Ford, ESSAYS ON THE CON-
STITUTION 376.
3 4 KENT, COMM. 105.
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Whenever, then, a general power exists, or is granted
to a government, which may in its actual exercise or
abuse be dangerous to the people, there seems a peculiar
property in restricting its operations, and in excepting
from it some of the mischievous forms, in which it may
be likely to be abused.3.5
This general statement seems more specific when applied to
the following statements by Justice Story in his explanations
of the separate amendments. Story refers to the Second Amend-
ment as, "This clause in our National bill of rights." Later in
reference to the Eighth Amendment he remarks as follows:
It was however, adopted, as an admonition to all
departments of the national government, to warn them
against such violent proceedings, as had taken place in
England in the arbitrary reigns of some of the Stuarts. 36
The preceding statements refer to two of the amendments that
Crosskey claims clearly were intended to apply to both levels
of government. On the basis of Judge Story's remarks this
one must again conclude otherwise.
Until this point we have been devoted to an analysis of the
Bill of Rights itself. Mr. Crosskey allowed himself the same
privilege after making the charge that the decision of the
Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore was a "sham", "un-
warranted", and "without any basis at all." His conclusion,
after covering this same ground is that the bill of rights, as the
framers meant it, was to apply to both the United States
government and the governments of the several states. When
the Barron case came before Marshall's court in 1833, the
only point of appeal was the applicability of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Barron felt that his loss of property, without compen-
sation entitled him to protection under the federal Bill of
Rights. ChiefJustice Marshall gave the opinion for the Court:
The Constitution was ordained and established by
the people of the United States for themselves, for their
35 Story, COMM. (1833 ed.) 696.
38 Id., 710.
own government, and not for the government of the in-
dividual states. The powers they conferred on this
government were to be exercised by itself; and the
limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are
naturally, and we think, necessarily, applicable to the
government created by the instrument.
If these propositions be correct, the fifrh amendment
must be understood as restraining the power of the gen-
eral government, not as applicable to the states . . .
Had the people of the several states, or any of them,
required changes in their constitutions; had they re-
quired additional safeguards to liberty from the ap-
prehended encroachments of their particular govern-
ments, the remedy was in their own hands ... serious
fears were extensively entertained that those powers,
which the patriot statesmen . . . deemed essential to
union . . . might be exercised in a manner dangerous
to liberty. In almost every convention by which the
constitution was adopted, amendments to guard against
the abuse of power were recommended. These amend-
ments demanded security against the apprehended
encroachments of the general government, not against
those of the local governments.
We are therefore of the opinion that there is no
repugnancy between the several acts of the general
assembly of Maryland ... and the constitution of the
United States. 3 7
It'is hard to view this decision as running contrary to the intent
of the framers, the meaning of the words, or even the under-
standing of "men of the day". Yet Crosskey makes such a
claim, stating that the decision was without basis.
In 1824 a Judge Walworth presided over the Courdand
Circuit in New York. The question of the applicability of these
amendments came before him; he allowed himself a broad
opinion on this point. 3 s This opinion which is partially
37 7 Peters (10 U. S.) 243 (1833).
3 8 Jackson v. Wood, 2 Cowan (N. Y.) 819 (1824).
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quoted below, was also used in the same year by Chief Justice
Savage of the New York Supreme Court, cited in Murphy v.
The People. 3 9
The terms of these amendments are broad enough
to embrace original proceedings in all courts. There
is nothing in the fifth or sixth amendments, taken by
themselves, to show whether they were intended to be
thus extensive . . . It therefore becomes necessary, in
order to ascertain the true construction, to refer to the
causes which produced the amendments, to the time and
manner of their adoption, and other attendant circum-
stances.
It is a well known fact, that, a very considerable
portion of the people... were disturbed on the grounds
that the powers of the general governments were not
sufficiently limited. They insisted that the authority of
the State governments was too much weakened . . .
Several states ... for a long time refused to accept the
constitution... and when the state conventions finally
ratified it, they recommended amendments and modi-
fications mostly restricting the power of the United
States.
Judge Walworth continued to note other points: First, is that
the first session of the Congress, from which the proposed
amendments originated, "expunged ... the only one (amend-
ment), restricting the powers of the states . . ." They also
amended the preamble by reciting, as the reason (for the
amendment): ". . . that the conventions of a number of
states, had at the time of their adopting the constitution, 'ex-
pressed a desire in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of
its powers'..." Judge Walworth concluded:
' * * and in most of the other state constitutions,
which have been formed or altered since that period
(ratification) there will be found exceptions to the
right of trial by jury, and other provisions, which are
wholly inconsistent with the idea that these amend-
30 2 Cowan ( N. Y.) 815 (1824).
ments to the constitution of the United States restrict
the powers of the state governments.
I am therefore dearly of the opinion that these
amendments were never intended to limit the powers
of the state, or to control the proceedings of state
courts... 40
Judge Walworth at this time found such inconsistencies in the
constitutions of Alabama, Mississippi, Maine, and New
Hampshire.
Seven years later Walworth became Chancellor of the
New York Court of Errors. In Livingston v. Mayor of New York,
two years before the Barron case, Walworth restated his former
opinion thusly: "All the amendments adopted by the Congress
at its first session, and afterwards sanctioned by the requisite
number of states were intended to be restrictive upon its officers
exclusively."41
Obviously the aforementioned cases contradict Crosskey.
In Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, reaching Marshall's court in
the same year, Judge Hopkins of the Circuit Court of Pennsyl-
vania had held that inconsistencies in the Pennsylvania con-
stitution were not "repugnant with the constitution and
amendments of the United States." This was affirmed by
Marshall's court. 42 In Louisiana in 1816, the case of Rentrop v.
Bourg found the amendments applicable to the federal govern-
ment only. 4 3 In this case, reference was made to Territory v.
Hattick, where again a similar opinion was rendered. There the
Attorney General ruled that "the parts of the Constitution of
the United States and its Amendments involved (6th) relate
only to the trials of crime against the United States. 44
40 Id., 821.
41 Livingston v. Mayor of New York, 8 Wendell (N. Y.) 85 (1831).
42 Livingston's Lessee v. Moore, 7 Peters (10 U. S.) 551 (1833).
43 Rentrop v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (La.) 97 (1816).
44 Terr. v. Hattick, 2 Mart. (La.) 87 (1811).
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SUMMARY
At the outset, this paper was intended as a probe into the
reliability and accuracy of William Crosskey's Politics and the
Constitution. Mr. Crosskey presented the work as a complete
and open study; and, since the work admittedly developed an
unorthodox and controversial thesis, one could not avoid the
significance of it.
Thus, the author has not attempted to refute Mr. Crosskey
completely. (He has, in deference to Mr. Crosskey's thirteen
years of study and research, taken a small point-the applic-
ability of the first eight amendments-which occupies only one
chapter). Crosskey's eighteenth century constructionary
system and his own sources of evidence have been the ground
rules. Throughout the paper his philosophy has not been
challenged. Yet, by his method, certain contradictory facts
have been brought to light.
It is my feeling that Crosskey approached the original
amendments with a pre-developed philosophy of nationalism.
The amendments seemingly were not as easy as other points to
draw into this theory; thus he was forced to make some very
unstable deductions. The various discussions in the state
ratifying conventions give a distinct feeling that the delegates
were predominantly fearful of federal power and encroachment.
At the same time, they were also reluctant to give more state
sovereignty than was necessary. Their words and the meanings
of those words are clear. The very same feelings were prevalent
in the public minds at the time. The framers, far-sighted as they
are renowned to have been, were attempting to create a
workable instrument, foremost for their countrymen, then their
descendants. The compact was necessarily framed within the
environment and philosophy of the era. Yet Crosskey seems
to have given these men an inconceivable degree of foresight
in his attempt to take up the 1787-91 instrument from its
original position in the development of the United States, and
place it down in a twentieth century setting.
The most striking note which Crosskey makes is the charge
that the Barron decision is utterly "without basis", -un-
warranted", etc. This position is untenable as Crosskey would
have his readers believe the Barron case itself was.
Mr. Crosskey's work, as a brief, would be adequate and
convincing, but to foster it upon his readers as a "scientifically
tested and proven theory of constitutional history" is either a
misconception of the scientific method or an inaccurate
appraisal of his own objectivity.
It is my conclusion that the Constitution was a document
which although durable and broadly phrased must be under-
stood as a product of eighteenth century minds. Because
veneration and sanctity surrounds it, America sometimes
loses sight of the possibility of adapting it to change through
its prescribed manner--amendment. The result is that the
Supreme Court adjusts it to changing times and new situations
through varied and strange practices. Yet it seems that this
is the only way it still survives as the law of the land.
If they wish it to be immortal the true friends
of the Constitution should be attentive, by amendments,
to make it keep pace with the advance of the ages in
science and experience. 4 6
DAVID WHITTINGHAM
46 Dumbauld, POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 125.
1960] NOTES
